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ABSTRACT 
 
The commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) market has vastly evolved over the last 
decade, but it remains a very private and proprietary market in comparison to other bond markets 
such as corporate or municipal bonds. The formation of CMBS data source providers such as 
Trepp and Intex in recent years has added transparency to the market, but large gaps still remain 
in available information for CMBS investors, particularly in the secondary trading market. This 
thesis examines pricing of CMBS at origination, when it is sold by the issuer, and after 
origination, when it is traded in the secondary market. Using a sample of AAA rated CMBS this 
thesis seeks to determine which factors influence price at origination and after.  
 
This thesis is essentially split into two separate studies, one examining pricing at origination and 
the other pricing after origination. For both parts, regression analyses were performed on fifty 
AAA rated securities issued from June of 2001 to December of 2006. All deal level information 
was provided by Trepp, while JP Morgan Chase provided historical AAA rated CMBS market 
information as a comparison.  Secondary pricing data, based on a proprietary pricing model was 
also provided by Trepp. A small sample of data from actual closed transactions in the secondary 
market was supplied by Morgan Stanley for comparison.  
 
The results of the first part of this thesis are very similar to previous works done on the topic and 
show that Debt Service Coverage Ratios, geographic concentration, and property type are all 
important factors in determining the initial price of a CMBS issuance. The results of the price at 
origination study show that investors preferred seasoned CMBS deals over new issues even 
though the fact that overall market spreads decreased during the studies time frame. This 
preference suggests that investors were more attracted to seasoned CMBS than they were to 
newer issuances. The second part of this thesis illustrated a similar inclination by investors to 
more seasoned CMBS in the secondary trading market. The authors conclude that variations do 
exist in the pricing of CMBS in the secondary trading market and that overall the market has 
significant enough transparency to incorporate different factors into investment decisions.  
 
Thesis Supervisor: William C. Wheaton 
 
Title: Professor of Economics 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
From June of 2007 to June of 2008, the average spread over swaps for AAA rated Commercial 
Mortgage Backed Securities increased by one hundred and thirty basis points to one hundred and 
fifty eight basis points. This vast increase was slight compared to March of 2008, when the 
average price for a AAA rated CMBS topped out at three hundred and ten basis points over 
swaps, an increase of two hundred and eighty five basis points from an average spread of just 
twenty five basis points in March of 2007. For close to twelve months now, the CMBS market 
has seen tumultuous increases in spreads, even in the least risky class of securities, those that are 
AAA rated.  
 
Though this turmoil has not been exclusive to the CMBS market and is part of the larger credit 
crisis that has nearly paralyzed the American economy, the lack of transparency in this still fairly 
young market has added an extra layer of fear and confusion. In the well seasoned world of 
corporate stocks and bonds, it is quite simple to look up a company’s current stock price and 
forecasted performance, but in the world of CMBS, it can be difficult for even sophisticated 
investors to find accurate and detailed information on their investments. Companies such as 
Trepp and Intex offer detailed databases that did not exist ten years ago, but their services can be 
expensive, and therefore not worthwhile for the average CMBS. Furthermore, these vendors still 
have limitations in their data collection due to the proprietary nature of the CMBS trading 
environment, relying on models to estimate CMBS pricing.  
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 This thesis sets out to determine what the most important factors in pricing CMBS are, in both 
the initial pricing of the bonds as well as secondary pricing, given the current economic 
environment along with the lack of transparency in the CMBS market. Using data provided by 
Trepp, as well as one investment bank, regression models will be designed to answer the 
question of how CMBS are and should be priced. Prior to discussing these models, it is important 
to begin with a history of CMBS to understand how the market has evolved to its current state. 
 
1.1 History of Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities 
Commercial Mortgaged Backed Securities (CMBS) began to emerge in the United States during 
the late 1980’s. The main catalyst for their development was the formation of the Resolution 
Trust Corporation (RTC), which was set up by the United States Government in 1989 to take 
over the (mainly real estate) assets of the savings and loan associations that were declared 
insolvent following the Savings and Loan Crisis (S&L) of the 1980’s. The RTC’s chief purpose 
was to liquidate the billions of dollars of real estate assets that it took over from banks during the 
S&L crisis. In the capital starved environment that followed the S&L Crisis, the creation of 
CMBS offered the RTC a way to sell these assets quickly.  
 
Leading up the formation of the RTC, a larger trend toward securitization with Residential 
Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS), Asset Backed Securities (ABS), and Collateralized Bond 
Obligations (CBO) emerged as popular investment tools. The biggest restraint that the CMBS 
market faced in its development in comparison to these types of securities was its perceived lack 
of transparency due to the heterogeneity of the underlying assets. With pools of residential 
mortgages or asset backed securities such as those backed by credit card debt or car loans, the 
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underlying assets are more uniform and, therefore are easier to assess overall risk. With pools of 
commercial mortgages, the underlying assets not only cross across various building types (office, 
hotel, multi-family, etc) and market locations, but also have varying term lengths. 1   
 
Rating Agencies Enter the Scene: CMBS Market Evolves 
When the three main rating agencies, Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard and Poor’s, introduced their 
respective models for rating these complex securities, investors started to feel more comfortable 
with their investments and the CMBS market began to attract more investment. With a rating 
system that was similar to that of more familiar securities such as corporate bonds, investors 
began to have more confidence in these assets and the likelihood they would receive coupon 
payments and, ultimately, the principal in a timely manner; investors felt that they were being 
fairly compensated for the risk of not seeing future cash flows. As the industry grew, these rating 
companies began to have more of an impact on the market and became, in many ways, the “de 
facto watchdog over the mortgage industry.”2  
 
Over the last twenty five years, the CMBS market has evolved fairly rapidly. In 1990, there were 
approximately $5 Billion in new CMBS issuances, close to $75 Billion in issuances by 1998, and 
by 2006 that number was more than $200 Billion. Total CMBS issues through the fall of 2006 
accounted for approximately 26% of the total U.S. Commercial Debt Market, up from 6% just a 
decade ago.3 
 
                                                          
1
 Buttimer, Richard, “Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities,”  The Belk College of Business UNC Charlotte 
2
 Lowenstein, Roger,. “Triple A Failure,” New York Times April 27, 2008. 
3
 Shugrue, Edward L. III, “Understanding Commercial Real Estate CDO’s,” PREA Quarterly Fall 2006. 
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Figure 1.1 demonstrates the growth of CMBS volume over the last twenty years, including the 
forecasted volume for 2008. 
 
Figure 1.1: Total CMBS Issuance Annually (In Billions): 1990 - 2008 
 
*Source: Commercial Real Estate Alert 
 
Subprime Market Implodes: CMBS Issuances Grind to a Halt 
As this chart exhibits, the CMBS market has followed a fairly even growth pattern throughout its 
history until midway through 2007, when the subprime market began to implode and the current 
credit crisis began. The majority of the $230 Billion in CMBS issuances in 2007 occurred in the 
first half of the year and by the start of 2008, the market for new issues was almost completely 
non-existent. In January of 2008, there were zero new issuances of CMBS, the first month of 
such an occurrence since the RTC stopped issuing CMBS in 1995. 
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As default rates on subprime and Alt-A residential mortgages began to soar in 2007, the millions 
of Americans who lost their homes were not the only casualties. The RMBS and Collateralized 
Debt Obligations (CDOs), as well as other complicated investment vehicles where these 
mortgages had been sold into, began to lose vast amounts of value, an unexpected event by many 
players in this market. These major players included the mortgage companies that had 
underwritten these mortgages and then quickly sold them off their balance sheets, as well as the 
investment banks that had bought the mortgages, pooled them together, and sold them as 
securitized bonds, while keeping large portions of these securities on their own books. As a 
result of these large losses, the investment banks and mortgage companies were forced to write-
down billions of dollars in lost value of these securities, which led to the current crisis in the 
financial markets. While the commercial real estate market had not seen anywhere near the 
erosion that the residential market was experiencing, all these factors led to fear in the overall 
financial markets, and particularly in real estate related markets that essential shut down the 
CMBS market by early 2008. 
 
Lax Underwriting Standards 
Fear was probably the biggest single factor that caused the CMBS market to dry up, but investors 
also had fundamental reasons to turn away from CMBS. As the CMBS market grew, the rating 
agencies began to deploy looser and looser criteria for their ratings. In 2002, the average Debt 
Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) (using the rating agency method which incorporates lower cash 
flows than models that use the actual and forecasted cash flows more commonly used by banks 
and other mortgage underwriters) was over 1.15 and the average Loan to Value (LTV) (also 
using the rating agency method) was at or below 85%. As Table 1.1 demonstrates, all three 
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major rating agencies (Moody’s, Fitch, and Standard & Poor’s) saw a significant decrease in the 
average DSCR and a substantial increase in average LTV in recent years as the commercial real 
estate industry boomed.  
 
Table 1.1: Average CMBS Characteristics By Rating Agency: 2004 – 2007 
Deal Mortgage Pool Size ($M) 
Moody 
LTV 
Fitch 
LTV 
S&P 
LTV 
 
Moody 
DSCR  
 Fitch 
DSCR  
 S&P 
DSCR  
2004 Average  $             1,233  85% 87% 88%      1.16     1.27     1.58  
2005 Average  $             2,111  95% 92% 95%      1.16     1.35     1.46  
2006 Average  $             2,651  101% 96% 99%      1.01     1.18     1.37  
YTD 2007 Average  $             3,368  111% 107% 112%      0.91     1.10     1.30  
 
*Source: Holliday Fenoglio Fowler, L.P. Rating Agency Presales, ytd November 20, 2007 
 
Subordination levels, which add a cushion to the higher rated tranches in a CMBS pool, also 
decreased significantly in recent years, as higher portions of CMBS pools were being classified 
as investment grade. Figure 1.2 tracks the decrease in the average subordination level of CMBS 
deals from 1995 through 2007, when subordination decreased from thirty three percent all the 
way down to twelve percent. 
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Figure 1.2: Percent of CMBS Pools Subordination: 1995 - 2006 
 
*Source: Holliday Fenoglio Fowler, L.P. GS Research; Commercial Mortgage Alert 
 
Further adding to the problem of eroding underwriting standards, in the most recent years 
leading up to the subprime meltdown of 2007, future income based on rental projections and 
assumptions was counted for Debt Service Coverage tests, such that often times debt service 
exceeded the cash flows on certain buildings at the start of the loan. In addition, the number of 
interest only loans issued increased dramatically. In the first quarter of 2007, eighty five percent 
of conduit deals were interest only, giving the issuers and bond holders less and less protection 
from balloon payment risk.  
 
 
 
 
Spreads on CMBS Skyrocket 
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Despite all of these factors, default rates on commercial mortgages still remain historically low. 
Figure 1.3, where the y axis on the right hand side represents total default rates and the x axis 
represents the date, indicates that even with a recent increase to a .33% default rate, defaults on 
commercial loans are still well below the historic average over the last ten years.   
 
Figure 1.3: Default Rates on Commercial Loans: January 1999 – January 2008 
 
 
*Source: Deutsche Bank and Intex 
 
Historically low default rates, however, have done little to lessen the fear in the CMBS market 
throughout 2008. Though there have been a few new issuances in more recent months, spreads 
on those offerings have been at historical highs. Figure 1.4 demonstrates the difference in 
spreads from January 2007 to January 2008 for Fixed Rate Investment Grade CMBS.  
Figure 1.4: Spreads on Fixed Rate Investment Grade CMBS: January 2007 – January 2008 
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*Source: JP Morgan Chase 
 
Figure 1.5 shows the pricing on one particular deal in April of 2008. The AAA rated tranches 
were priced at a 200-500 basis point spread and the riskier BBB pieces were priced at historically 
high spreads of 1300-1800 basis points.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.5: Pricing on an Actual CMBS Issuance from April 2008 
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*Source: Commercial Mortgage Alert 
 
Clearly, with default rates still at historical lows, BBB bonds priced at a 1300 basis point spreads 
are taking into account current credit market conditions and liquidity fears, as opposed to any 
expected default rates or other credit factors. The CMBS market has seen spreads jump 
substantially in a short period of time due to macroeconomic factories in other periods of history 
as well. With the collapse of Long-term Capital Management in 1998 as well as the terrorist 
attacks of September 11th, CMBS spreads saw a quick increase; however those events did not 
lead to a jump in spreads of anywhere near the same magnitude that the current credit crisis has 
caused. Figure 1.6 demonstrates the average spread over swaps for AAA CMBS from 1997 
through 2008, with short lasting increases in late 1998 as well as in 2001.  
 
Figure 1.6: AAA CMBS Spread to Swaps: January 1997 to January 2008 
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*Source: JP Morgan Chase 
 
1.2 Summary and Goals of This Study 
Given the current credit environment, the authors felt that it was an appropriate time to study 
Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities. The main goal of this paper is to analyze the factors 
that influence the pricing and valuing of Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities both in the 
initial issuance market, as well as in the secondary trading market. To accomplish this goal, this 
paper will address two separate studies. The first study will examine pricing of CMBS at 
origination, and the second study will examine pricing of CMBS after origination.   
 
A number of studies, which will be discussed further in the literature review, have already 
examined the major drivers of pricing at origination, therefore the first part of this paper will 
seek to build upon those existing studies and provide a current look at what drives spreads in the 
initial pricing market. In today’s market, large variations in initial pricing spreads of similarly 
rated CMBS deals still exist, suggesting that investors in the CMBS market continue to use other 
factors outside of the just the rating to price CMBS at their origination.  With the credit crisis 
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still fresh in investor’s minds, the authors believe that it is an opportune time to explore these 
criteria further.  
 
For the second part of this study, because published literature on pricing after origination does 
not currently exist, the authors will attempt to uncover what the most important variables are in 
determining secondary pricing spreads of CMBS. This part of the thesis analyzes pricing in the 
secondary market from two different perspectives. The first perspective (scenario) is to analyze 
current prices as dependent on current market and performance variables. The second 
perspective (scenario) analyzes the changes in current prices since origination as a function of 
changes of current market and performance variables since origination. 
 
Both studies evaluate market as well as deal level variables, but the specific variables analyzed at 
origination and after origination are different. At origination there is more emphasis on 
underlying loan characteristics such as Debt Service Coverage Ratio, Loan to Value, and 
geographic concentration. After origination emphasis is on credit status characteristics such as 
delinquency and foreclosure percentages. 
 
Pricing in the CMBS market at origination is transparent. This transparency is evidenced by the 
dispersion in pricing spreads for similarly rated CMBS deals. In the secondary market, price 
transparency is not as obvious. Secondary market data on individual deals is not readily 
available, therefore the second part of this study, pricing after origination, will also try to 
conclude whether or not the secondary CMBS market is transparent. 
Chapter Two 
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Literature Review 
 
Due to the enormous growth in Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities over the last twenty 
five years, extensive research has been focused on CMBS. Research has focused on a range of 
topics such as default rates, structure, and subordination levels, though minimal research, at least 
in publication, has been performed on price discovery, initial pricing, the secondary pricing 
market, and valuation of CMBS. Unlike other bond markets, such as the corporate bond market 
where company information and financials are readily available to investors, it remains 
incredibly difficult to find the information necessary to properly price and value bonds in the 
CMBS market. This lack of data is likely the major hindrance to any substantial research papers 
being written on the topics of pricing and valuation in CMBS.  The authors suspect that 
investment banks and private research companies have done extensive research on these issues, 
but have not made the results public due to the proprietary nature of the information. 
  
Polleys and Kilgore in “An Empirical Investigation of Commercial Mortgaged-Backed Securities 
Pricing and the Role of the Rating Agencies” evaluate the impact of credit, non-credit, and rating 
agency factors on the pricing of AAA rated CMBS. The study analyzed pricing at origination 
and focused on 51 transactions, representing 89 AAA securities that were issued between the 1st 
quarter 1994 and the 1st quarter 1996. The results of their “pricing spread regression analysis 
show that both non-credit and credit factors impact pricing of CMBS, but that there is no pricing 
impact based on the rating agency(s) which rates the transaction.” (1996, 2) Polleys and Kilgore 
concluded that the “existence of significant credit variables effects indicate there is a disparity in 
the evaluation of credit risk between the market and the rating agencies.” (1996, 2) 
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The Polleys and Kilgore study is an excellent framework for this paper. Written in 1996 when 
the CMBS market was still a relatively new area of study, the Polleys and Kilgore study has yet 
to be updated or expanded upon, despite the quadrupling in size of the CMBS market over the 
last twelve years. This paper will also evaluate pricing at origination and builds upon the work of 
Polleys and Kilgore, with some modifications. One major difference between the two studies is 
that while both papers attempt to examine any factors that influence initial spreads at origination, 
this paper is less concerned about differentiating between credit and non-credit variables, a major 
component of the Kilgore and Polleys study.  
  
The authors in this study also have the advantage of more up-to-date databases that track CMBS 
data. One of the major challenges that Kilgore and Polleys faced was data collection, and data 
arrangement so that their model would make a fair and accurate comparison between securities. 
Much of the data that was analyzed for the purposes of this paper came from Trepp Analytics, 
which is now the leading provider of CMBS and commercial mortgage information. Trepp began 
collecting and selling their extensive services and database in 1997, after the Kilgore and 
Polleys’ thesis was written. Without access to such a database, Kilgore and Polleys had to 
depend upon deal prospecti and the rating agencies for their data.  
 
Polleys, individually, went on to write a follow-up paper to the thesis she had written with 
Kilgore. The updated Polleys article adds additional credit and non credit variables to her 
original analysis and uses 70 transactions, representing 125 AAA securities. The updated study 
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has similar results to the original study, that both credit and non-credit factors impact pricing at 
origination. 
 
Brian Lancaster in “Introduction to Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities” (Fabozzi, 2001, 1) 
examines the key factors that influence pricing of CMBS and provides a basic framework for 
investors when analyzing CMBS transactions. Lancaster indicates that debt service coverage 
ratio (DSCR) and the loan to value ratio (LTV) are the two most important indicators of the 
credit quality of the collateral backing a CMBS. Lancaster notes the importance of evaluating not 
only the weighted average DSCR, but also the range of DSCRs for the loans in the pool. Other 
factors that Lancaster evaluates are property location and types, loan types, loan underwriting 
standards, loan size/concentration, and prepayment terms/call protection. Lancaster’s analysis of 
these factors gives the authors a strong foundation to investigate which factors would be most 
important in their study. 
 
Lancaster also discusses how CMBS trade. Because of “their excellent prepayment protection 
and sensitivity to credit risk, highest quality investment grade CMBS (AAAs through As) tend to 
trade more like corporate bonds than residential MBS.” (Fabozzi, 2001, 14) Due to risk 
associated with the average life and price risk, “CMBS tend to trade at wider spreads than same 
rated and same average life corporate bonds. In addition, the nature of CMBS collateral can pose 
a greater analytical challenge than corporate debt.” (Fabozzi, 2001, 16) Lancaster also discusses 
that within the CMBS sector, similarly rated CMBS with comparable average lives can trade at 
spreads as different as 20 bps. Lancaster’s explanation is that the market evaluates other factors 
beyond the rating, prepayment risk, liquidity, and how well a “name” trades and has traded 
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versus other “names.” One could argue that these factors are non-credit factors and that the rating 
agencies did not take these factors into account when assigning a rating to the CMBS. The 
purpose of this study will be to evaluate any factors that the authors feel might influence initial 
spreads when an issue is first marketed, either non-credit or credit factors. 
 
Jacob and Patel in “The Efficient Frontier for CMBS and Commercial Mortgages Using a Risk-
Return Framework” (Fabozzi, 2001, 89) analyze, on a risk-adjusted basis, the relative value 
between the various classes in a CMBS deal. Even though this study focuses solely on the AAA 
class, is the study is still noteworthy to mention as it attempts to analyze pricing and valuation. 
Jacob and Patel make the argument that the stated, initial pricing spread is simply the internal 
rate of return, usually assuming no default (and possibly no prepayment). “It is not the expected 
or average return in any sense.” (Fabozzi, 2001, 89) Some investors run yield tables based on 
default and prepayment scenarios to overcome these shortcomings, but Jacob and Patel argue 
that the scenarios typically do not match the quality of the underlying collateral. Jacob and Patel 
have created a model that chooses “scenarios that directly link to the quality of the loan pool,” 
(Fabozzi, 2001. 90) and the results show an efficient frontier that represents “the set of 
investments with the highest expected returns for each level of risk.” (Fabozzi, 2001. 90) 
 
Gordon and Gibson in “Structure, Valuation, and Performance of CMBS” (Fabozzi, 2001, 97) 
provide a similar analysis to Lancaster’s article. The main difference between the two analyses is 
that Gordon and Gibson emphasize the possibility of extension risk. Most commercial mortgages 
are underwritten with a stated final maturity of 15-30 years and a balloon payment due after 10 
years. The lockout protection in the underlying commercial real estate loans provides excellent 
 21 
protection from prepayment risk, whereas extension will only occur to the extent that borrowers 
cannot make their balloon payment and make arrangements with the servicer to extend their 
repayment schedules. The Gordon and Gibson study provides the frame work for another factor 
that the authors can consider in their analysis. It is worth noting that the original Polleys and 
Kilgore thesis did not include balloon payment as a factor, but that the updated Polleys article 
did. Unfortunately, the authors were unable to measure extension risk in this study. The deal 
history of the fifty deals used in this study did not have one occurrence of an unintended 
extension event, most likely due to borrower’s ease of re-financing during the time frame of this 
study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Three 
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Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data 
The main source of data for this research was Trepp, LLC, the leading provider of CMBS and 
commercial mortgage information to the issuers, investors, and all users of CMBS. Fifty AAA 
rated CMBS securities issued between June 2001 and December 2006 were chosen from Trepp’s 
extensive database. The individual fifty AAA rated securities were chosen with a preference for 
higher total loan balance, and excluded FNMA and Freddie Mac multifamily CMBS. The 
authors felt that securities with higher loan balances would have a higher number of investors 
compared to securities with smaller loans balances, and, therefore, price history of these 
securities would be more reflective of the market. Table 3.1 is a summary of the average deal 
statistics. 
Table 3.1: Average Deal Statistics of Data 
Deal Statistics Average Minimum Maximum
Mortgage Pool Size 1,698,429,058$  722,145,490$       4,273,091,953$       
DSCR 1.66 1.32 3.12
LTV (%) 66.7 46.78 72.75
 
Data was concentrated to this particular investment class as well as this specific time period for 
the following reasons. With limited time available to complete this thesis, it was necessary to 
choose only one class to focus on. AAA rated securities were chosen over another rating 
category, mainly due to the more frequent and transparent nature of the AAA market versus 
other non-investment grade classes. While a variety of investors often purchase AAA rated 
CMBS bonds due to their perceived relative low risk, buyers are more concentrated when it 
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comes to the junior pieces, particularly the non-investment grade classes. Therefore, the authors 
felt detailed information if needed outside of Trepp’s database would be easier to obtain in the 
AAA class. The time period was chosen because it offered a period long enough to control for 
specific macroeconomic changes, but short enough to provide some meaningful results.  
For each of these fifty securities, Trepp also provided specific deal level data including the initial 
price (quoted as a spread over treasury), as well as numerous credit-and non credit variables from 
the time of issuance through January of 2008, updated on a monthly basis.4 In addition, Trepp 
provided secondary pricing for each of these fifty securities based on their proprietary pricing 
model from origination through June of 2008, updated on a daily basis.5 Trepp emphasizes in its 
pricing description that while CMBS is categorized as a Mortgage Backed Security, the process 
of establishing prices for CMBS bonds is different from pricing Residential MBS. According to 
Trepp, in the RMBS universe, credit concerns are dwarfed by interest rate risk considerations. In 
the CMBS universe, however, the opposite is true. Credit risk dominates the analytical process in 
CMBS, as interest rate sensitivity, while still relevant, is of secondary concern.  
Trepp utilizes multiple sources of information to analyze collateral data, and a number of 
elements are constantly updated in their model. Key elements that are analyzed include:  
• Property Type Diversity  
• Ongoing Financial Performance of Collateral  
• Exposure to Troubled Tenants  
• Unique Geographical Risk  
• Delinquency Statistics  
                                                          
4
 See Appendix, Exhibit 1 for all deal history variables provided by Trepp 
5
 See Appendix, Exhibit 2 for all price history variables provided by Trepp 
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• Appraisal Reductions  
• Loan Modifications  
• Loan Defeasances  
While the second study, pricing after origination, uses the modeled prices provided from Trepp, 
the authors were able to obtain limited secondary pricing data from Morgan Stanley based on 
actual closed transactions in the secondary market. The pricing data from Morgan Stanley 
consisted of 384 price points ranging across fifteen of the fifty CMBS deals used in this paper. 
This pricing data is compared to the 46,283 price points across the fifty CMBS deals provided by 
Trepp. The pricing data from Morgan Stanley provided a check on Trepp’s pricing data, to help 
understand how much of the actual market transaction pricing is being captured by Trepp’s 
internal model. Figure 3.1 shows the regression results of this comparison, while Figure 3.2 is a 
scatter plot of the observations, looking at actual transaction price versus modeled price. The 
data from Morgan Stanley was paired with the pricing data from Trepp based on date. Only 349 
price points of the 384 from Morgan Stanley were able to be paired with the Trepp price points, 
due to mismatches in dates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Regression Results for Comparison Between Trepp Pricing Model and Morgan 
Stanley Data 
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Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.490314914 
R Square 0.240408715 
Adjusted R Square 0.238219691 
Standard Error 4.240752768 
Observations 349 
 
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat 
Intercept 43.37070172 5.357173477 8.095818048 
Trepp Price 0.56838419 0.05423656 10.47972422 
 
Figure 3.2: Scatter Plot of Observations of Trepp Modeled Prices (x axis) and Actual 
Morgan Stanley Prices (y axis) 
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The outliers on Figure 3.2 are specific to the time frame between January 2008 and April 2008, 
and are not specific to any one CMBS deal. The outliers, authors believe, are specific to this time 
frame for the following reasons: volatility in the CMBS market, irrational investor behavior, or 
the lag associated with Trepp’s model to incorporate actual prices at this time. The authors 
believe that this comparison between Morgan Stanley and Trepp validates the use of Trepp’s 
modeled prices prior to 2008. Unfortunately, the discrepancy between Morgan Stanley and Trepp 
prices from January 2008 until April 2008 demonstrates the ambiguity of CMBS pricing.  
 
The Deal Variables: Pricing At Origination Model 
Table 3.2 names and explains each of the deal variables used for the “Pricing at Origination” 
model. A more detailed description of why these variables were chosen over others for this 
analysis can be found in section 3.2.  
Table 3.2:  Deal Variables for Pricing at Origination Model With Descriptions 
 
Pricing At Origination  
Variable Description 
Average Market Spread Benchmark spread provided by J.P. Morgan matched to duration 
Date Number of Days from first deal in Model 1 data set (from 6/1/01) 
RetailAnchoredPct Percent of pool classified as Retail/Anchored 
State1Pct 
Percent of pool concentrated in largest state, by balance, at the 
property level 
Duration Duration of the Bond 
CutoffDSCR_NCF DSCR as of closing, based on net cash flow 
CutoffAaaSubordination Lowest Credit enhancement at the AAA level as of closing 
HotelFullPct 
Percent of pool that is Full Service Hotel (generally, includes some 
form of restaurant and meeting rooms) 
RetailUnanchoredPct Percent of pool classified as Retail/Unanchored 
Top5LoansPct Percent of pool concentrated in 5 largest loans 
OfficePct Percent of pool classified as office 
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MultifamilyPct Percent of pool classified as Multi-family 
CutoffLTV Average loan to value ratio at closing 
IndustrialPct Percent of pool classified as Industrial 
MonthsYM 
Average number of months before the end of the yield maintenance 
period.  Generally starts at the end of lockout 
MonthsPenalty 
Average number of months before the end of the fixed prepayment 
penalty period 
 
The Deal Variables: Pricing After Origination Model – First Scenario 
Table 3.3 names and explains each of the variables used for the first scenario examining pricing 
after origination. 
Table 3.3:  Deal Variables for Pricing After Origination Model (First Scenario) With 
Descriptions 
 
Pricing After Origination – First Scenario 
Variable Description 
Current Deal Spread Current Deal Spread over relevant treasury 
Current Mkt Spread 
Current market spread over treasury, matched to treasury rate from 
current market spread 
Date Number of Days from Origination 
Current DSCR Current DSCR, based on net cash flow 
Current AAA 
Subordination Current Lowest Credit enhancement at the AAA level 
ASER Pct 
Current balance of loans subject to ASER, as a % of Current 
Balance 
PerformSpecialSrvcdPct Percent, based on balance of loans in Special Servicer 
Delinq90DayPct Percent, based on balance of loans more than 90 days delinquent 
ForeclosurePct Percent, based on balance of loans in Foreclosure 
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The Deal Variables: Pricing After Origination Model –  Second Scenario 
Table 3.4 names and explains each of the variables used for the second scenario modeling 
pricing after origination. 
Table 3.4:  Deal Variables for Pricing After Origination Model (Second Scenario) With 
Descriptions 
 
Pricing After Origination – Second Scenario 
Variable Description 
Diff in Deal Spread Difference between current deal spread and spread at origination 
Diff in Current Mkt 
Spread 
Difference between current market spread and market spread at 
origination 
Date Number of Days from Origination 
Diff in DSCR 
Difference between Current DSCR and DSCR as of closing 
(origination), based on net cash flow 
Diff in AAA 
Subordination 
Difference between current Lowest Credit enhancement at the AAA 
level and AAA level as of closing (origination) 
ASER Pct 
Current balance of loans subject to ASER, as a % of Current 
Balance 
PerformSpecialSrvcdPct Percent, based on balance of loans in Special Servicer 
Delinq90DayPct Percent, based on balance of loans more than 90 days delinquent 
ForeclosurePct Percent, based on balance of loans in Foreclosure 
REOPct Percent, based on balance of loans classified as Real Estate Owned 
 
The Market Variable 
All pricing spreads provided by Trepp needed to be compared to some benchmark spread or 
market variable in order to control for variations in the market. As with all investment types, 
spreads in Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities respond to specific market conditions and 
occurrences. It is necessary to compare all securities to the same market benchmark in order to 
determine which characteristics of one security make it different from another, resulting in a 
dispersion in pricing spread. The point of reference used for the all of these models was the 
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average market spread calculated by investment banks that frequently trade and issue CMBS 
bonds. JP Morgan Investment Bank provided average spreads on a weekly basis for AAA CMBS 
bonds of four different durations, three, five, seven, and ten years. In the “Pricing At 
Origination” model, the initial spread of each bond was compared to the average AAA CMBS 
spread over treasury for the corresponding duration at that point in time. For the “Pricing After 
Origination” first scenario model, the current deal specific spread was compared to the current 
market spread of CMBS bonds of a corresponding duration. For the “Pricing After Origination” 
second scenario model, the difference in the current pricing spread and the initial spread was 
compared to the change in the market spread for bonds of a comparable duration over the 
corresponding time period. 
 
The Time Variable 
In addition to market and deal variables, it was also necessary to create a time variable for each 
model. For the “Pricing At Origination” model, each of the fifty bonds had an initial issuance 
date in the month/day/year format. In order to analyze pricing over time, these dates had to be 
converted to a time variable in the format of days. The first date of issuance of any of the bonds 
was 06/01/2001, and considered day zero and every other date of issuance was converted to a 
number of days from 6/1/01. The time variable, therefore, ranges from 0 to 2022 (2022 days 
from 06/01/2001 or 12/14/2006. For both scenarios of the “Pricing After Origination” model, the 
time variable created was the time elapsed since origination, again in the number of days format.  
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3.2 Methodology 
The authors used regression analysis in Microsoft Office Excel to analyze each of the deal level 
variables, time variables, and market variables. The process for the “Pricing At Origination” 
model was slightly different from that of the ”Pricing After Origination” models in that it utilized 
a step regression analysis procedure.  In this process, each variable was tested initially using 
univariate regression analysis, meaning each variable was tested for significance as a single 
independent variable that may or may not significantly impact the dependent variable (in this 
case the initial spread). This process was an important step for the “Pricing At Origination” 
model due to the significant number of variables initially provided to the authors by Trepp. 
Trepp’s deal history data included one hundred and seventy five different variables, many of 
which the authors suspected would not have any impact on the initial pricing spreads. As each 
variable was tested individually, only those that appeared significant were then utilized in the 
multivariate regression analysis. Through this step regression process, the authors were able to 
narrow down the variables from Trepp’s initial one hundred and seventy five variables to a more 
manageable sixteen factors, including the market and time variables. The final sixteen variables 
in addition to market and time were percent retail anchored, percent in state one percent, 
duration, cutoff DSCR, cutoff AAA subordination, percent hotel, percent retail unanchored, 
percent in top five loans, percent office, percent multi-family, cutoff LTV, percent industrial, 
months yield maintenance, and months penalty. These sixteen variables were then analyzed in 
different combinations with each other to find out which had the most significance. 
 
The first scenario in the “Pricing After Origination” model uses a standard linear regression 
equation, setting current deal spread as the dependent variable and the other factor variables 
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listed in table 3.3 as the independent variables, to help determine which factors are influencing 
current market spreads over time. The second scenario in the “Pricing After Origination” model 
was created after interpreting the results from the first scenario. The second scenario controls for 
changes in these variables from origination. Using a standard linear regression equation, the 
regression sets the difference in current deal spread since its inception as the dependent variable 
and the other variables listed in table 3.4 as the independent variables. The authors believe that 
the second scenario will improve upon the results observed from the first model. 
 
For all of the models, before beginning regression analysis, the authors considered each variable 
in depth and attempted to forecast whether the occurrence of such a variable would have a 
positive or negative impact on the price of the security (whether the initial price or the secondary 
price depending on the model). The predicted coefficients were then compared to the actual 
coefficient results and any surprising results were addressed further.  
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Chapter 4 
Pricing At Origination Model and Results 
4. 1 Coefficient Predictions 
Table 4.1 demonstrates the authors’ initial thoughts on how each variable would impact the 
initial pricing spread. A positive (+) coefficient means that the variable would lead to a higher 
pricing spread, while a negative (-) coefficient means the opposite, that the variable would cause 
the pricing spread to be lower, commonly referred to as “tighter spread.” 
Table 4.1: Coefficient Predictions - Pricing at Origination Model 
Variable 
Predicted 
Coefficient  Reason 
Initial Spread  Dependent Variable 
Average Market 
Spread + 
Each specific bond is expected to correlate strongly with the 
market 
Date - 
Market Spreads decreased over time during this time period 
so it is expected an increase in time would correlate to a 
decrease in initial spread. 
RetailAnchoredPct - Anchored retail suggests a strong tenant roster and less risk 
State1Pct + 
Higher concentration in one state suggests more geographic 
risk 
Duration - Bonds of shorter duration are thought to be less risky 
CutoffDSCR_NCF - Higher DSCR suggests more cushion for payment of loans 
CutoffAaa 
Subordination - 
Higher subordination gives more protection to the AAA 
holder 
HotelFullPct + Hotels are perceived to be a more risky property type 
Retail 
UnanchoredPct ? 
Retail unanchored properties are thought to be more risky 
than anchored retail but retail is still considered a strong 
property type, particularly if it is in a mixed use property. 
Top5LoansPct + More concentration in fewer loans seen as more risky 
OfficePct ? 
Office properties have a relatively low delinquency rate but 
longer term leases add risk 
MultifamilyPct - 
Short term nature of leases lessens risk and allow revenue to 
rise with expenses 
CutoffLTV - Lower LTV adds cushion to the risk of default 
IndustrialPct + Specialized uses add to rollover risk 
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MonthsYM +   
MonthsPenalty - 
The more months left on the pre-payment penalty the less 
risk 
 
4. 2 Regression Results 
(Dependent Variable = Initial Spread) 
Figure 4.1 shows the regression results for this model: 
 
Figure 4.1: Regression Results for Pricing at Origination Model – All Sixteen Variables 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.97242076 
R Square 0.945602134 
Adjusted R Square 0.918403201 
Standard Error 6.016238983 
Observations 50 
 
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat 
Intercept 38.9888368 46.06009344 0.84647759 
AAA Spread Over Treasury 1.11220804 0.105297521 10.5625283 
Date 0.00551744 0.003529388 1.56328377 
RetailAnchoredPct -0.1813911 0.109344336 -1.6588983 
State1Pct 0.32250077 0.175944687 1.83296682 
Duration -1.0033942 0.627065628 -1.6001423 
CutoffDSCR_NCF -9.1405071 4.903415376 -1.8641103 
CutoffAaaSubordination -0.0007951 0.269764066 -0.0029472 
HotelFullPct 0.30275316 0.344368634 0.87915428 
RetailUnanchoredPct -0.1290878 0.195988387 -0.6586501 
Top5LoansPct 0.06974658 0.146232165 0.47695787 
OfficePct -0.0189223 0.093700979 -0.2019432 
MultifamilyPct 0.06262929 0.132813982 0.47155644 
CutoffLTV -0.4338893 0.422944609 -1.0258773 
IndustrialPct 0.30467405 0.256854961 1.18617156 
MonthsYM 0.30225856 0.365366421 0.82727516 
MonthsPenalty -0.3932943 0.418462063 -0.9398566 
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Using the methodology described in Chapter 3, the authors obtained 97.2% of the variation in 
initial deal spread as compared to the average market spread. Only one of the independent 
variables is significant at a 95% confidence level. 
  
Because only one independent variable was found to be significant, regression analyses was re-
run with different combinations of variables in an attempt to identify other independent variables 
that were significant. Figure 4.2 shows the regression results for a combination of nine different 
variables, five of which were found to be significant.  
  
Figure 4.2: Regression Results for Pricing at Origination Model – Nine Variables 
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.968107673
R Square 0.937232467
Adjusted R Square 0.922747651
Standard Error 5.853887388
Observations 50
 
 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept 10.71773061 10.93839308 0.979826793
AAA Spread Over Treasury 1.131466997 0.096169311 11.7653645
CutoffDSCR_NCF -4.914121103 2.7868365 -1.763333121
Date 0.006181988 0.003056351 2.022669334
RetailUnanchoredPct -0.111784635 0.159773553 -0.699644169
RetailAnchoredPct -0.197748095 0.09210821 -2.14691063
HotelFullPct -0.03509817 0.285792926 -0.122809792
State1Pct 0.273566319 0.095143577 2.875299915
Duration -1.34031983 0.586683987 -2.284568624
CutoffAaaSubordination -0.147318158 0.242156309 -0.608359776
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This regression analysis produced a 96.8% variation in initial deal spread as compared to the 
average market spread. 
 
Figure 4.3 shows the regression results for the same variables, excluding Hotel Percent, Retail 
Unanchored, and Cutoff Subordination, all of which did not have a significant T-stat in the 
previous regression analysis. The authors kept Cutoff DSCR despite the fact it was not 
significant because the T-Stat of -1.76 was close to the 1.9 T-Stat significance level. The authors 
obtained a 96.8 % of the variation in initial deal spread as compared to the average market 
spread, with five out of six variables significant within a 95% confidence level. Cutoff DSCR 
was still not found to be significant, but it will be discussed in the following sections due to its 
possible relevance.   
 
Figure 4.3: Regression Results for Pricing at Origination Model – Six Variables 
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.967520666
R Square 0.93609624
Adjusted R Square 0.926967131
Standard Error 5.691774654
Observations 50
 
 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept -1.88535493 12.75585711 -0.14780308
AAA Spread Over Treasury 1.12216498 0.092127439 12.1805728
CutoffDSCR_NCF -4.55455158 2.672369737 -1.70431191
Date 0.006067402 0.002829852 2.14407061
RetailAnchoredPct -0.17513089 0.084120202 -2.08191233
State1Pct 0.296991302 0.085615884 3.46888086
Duration -1.40509018 0.562290879 -2.49886711
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4.3 Discussion of Variables 
Table 4.2: Discussion of Variables - First Scenario Pricing After Origination Model 
Average Market 
Spread 
The positive sign is expected. A 1% increase in the average 
market spread results in a 1.12% increase in the initial 
spread. 
 
Date 
  
The positive sign is unexpected. Each year beyond 6/1/01 
results in an initial spread increase of 2.21%.  
 
RetailAnchoredPct 
 
The negative sign is expected. A 1% increase in percent 
anchored retail results in a .175% decrease in the initial 
spread. 
 
State1Pct 
 
The positive sign is expected. A 1% increase in the percent 
of pool in State 1 results in a .297% increase in the initial 
spread. 
 
Duration 
 
The negative sign is expected. A 1% increase in duration 
results in a 1.405% decrease in the initial spread.  
 
CutoffDSCR_NCF 
 
The negative sign is expected. An increase of 1% in the 
DSCR results in a 4.55% decrease in the initial spread. 
  
 
This regression analysis returned very similar results to the Kilgore and Polleys study, though the 
chosen variables are slightly different and therefore the two studies cannot be compared exactly. 
In one test performed by Kilgore and Polleys’ in which they were testing the percent 
subordination required by investors, a .1 increase in Debt Service Coverage Ratio resulted in a 
2.39% decrease in the required subordination. This is consistent with the author’s results 
showing that a 1% increase in the DSCR resulted in a 4.55% decrease in the initial spread, 
demonstrating that investors favor higher Debt Service Coverage Ratios. In the same test, 
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Kilgore and Polleys’ found Retail6 to have a downward influence on the required subordination, 
with a 10% increase in retail collateral in a pool resulting in a 1.029% drop in the required 
subordination, showing that investors at that time favored retail as a property type. The Polleys 
Kilgore results are similar to the results here, in which an increase of 1% in the percent of 
anchored retail resulted in a .175% decrease in the initial spread, demonstrating that investors 
still favor retail. Kilgore and Polleys’ also found similar results concerning geographic 
concentration. In the same test, they found that a 10% increase in the geographic concentration 
of the collateral resulted in a .67% increase in the required subordination, revealing that investors 
did not favor high concentration in one geographic location. In this study, a 1% increase in the 
concentration of properties in the top state resulted in a .297% increase in the initial spread.   
 
One variable that returned surprising results is the date variable. Kilgore and Polleys’ performed 
another test to study dispersion in spreads and found that for each additional year after their start 
date of March, 1994, spreads declined by 2.8 basis points. This decline was consistent with a 
trend of lower average spreads in the AAA rated CMBS market over the same time period.  
While, the same trend was true for the AAA rated CMBS market for the time period in this study 
(as demonstrated in Figure 4.4), the date variable in this study varied from that of the Kilgore 
and Polleys’s study, producing a positive coefficient sign, indicating that spreads on new issues 
have increased over time.  
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 In the Polley’s and Kilgore study this variable was not split up between retail anchored and 
retail unanchored 
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Figure 4.4: Average Market Spreads for AAA CMBS: June 2001 – December 2006 
  
*Source: JP Morgan Chase 
This unexpected result suggests that the authors are missing an important factor in their analysis. 
One very relevant factor that may be missing is the change in actual treasury rates over this time 
period. This analysis carefully tracks changes in market spreads, but this model does not control 
for any changes in treasury rates. This could be an important factor due to the total expected 
return of a particular security. For example, if the base treasury rate that a spread is quoted on is 
just 1%, a 100 basis point spread would mean a risk premium of 100% above the treasury 
(considered to be the risk free rate). At the same time if treasury rates are higher, say 4%, a 100 
basis point spread would only mean a 25% risk premium over the risk free rate despite the same 
spread level.  
 
In order to test for changes in treasury, the authors added a variable for corresponding treasury 
rates to control for any changes in treasuries. The expectation was that once treasury rates were 
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controlled for, the result would be a negative coefficient for the date variable. The authors ran 
this using the six final variables from the initial regressions (the five significant variables plus 
the Cutoff DSCR) plus the treasury rates.  
 
Figure 4.5 shows the regression results for the five significant variables, plus Cutoff DSCR and 
with the addition of Treasury rates.  
 
Figure 4.5: Regression Results for Pricing at Origination Model – Six Variables Plus 
Treasury Rates 
 
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.967544769
R Square 0.93614288
Adjusted R Square 0.925240445
Standard Error 5.758665745
Observations 50
 
 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat
Intercept -2.13351329 12.98519511 -0.16430352
AAA Spread Over Treasury 1.137532222 0.128740538 8.83585105
Date 0.006558258 0.004030294 1.62724081
Corresponding Treasury -0.00372684 0.0215364 -0.17304843
Duration -1.41206321 0.570324332 -2.47589509
State1Pct 0.299354713 0.087692128 3.41370108
CutoffDSCR_NCF -4.53240735 2.706802573 -1.67445066
RetailAnchoredPct -0.18050633 0.090600401 -1.99233477
 
 
When controlling for changes in Treasury Rates, signs of all coefficients remain exactly the same 
as in the original model, including the date variable, though now the date variable does not have 
a significant T-stat. The positive date variable shows that changes in treasury rates are not the 
missing factor.  
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After further consideration, the authors concluded that the lack of an exact comparison between 
the deal level variables and the market variable was causing this unexpected result. The market 
variable includes both new issuances and trades in the secondary market, while the deal variables 
look exclusively at initial issuances.  Thus while the  market spreads for AAA rated CMBS 
clearly decreased from 2001 to 2006, demonstrating a fondness by investors for AAA rated 
CMBS overall, the regression results show an aversion over this same period to new CMBS 
issuances. In fact, an increase of one year, when controlling for Treasury Rates and all the other 
variables, results in a 2.39% increase in the initial spread. This relationship implies that investors 
were skeptical about newer issued CMBS and were inclined to pay a premium for seasoned 
AAA rated CMBS.  Given the looser underwriting standards by the rating agencies in recent 
years, clearly demonstrated in Table 1.1 of the Introduction chapter, it is not surprising that 
investors favored re-sales in the secondary market over new issuances and demonstrates that 
investors concluded that a AAA rated CMBS issued in 2006 was not of the same quality as a 
AAA CMBS issued a few years before. 
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Chapter 5 
Pricing After Origination Models and Results 
 
5.1 Coefficient Predictions – First Scenario Pricing After Origination Model 
Table 5.1 shows the coefficient predictions for the first scenario of the “Pricing After 
Origination” Model. As with the “Pricing At Origination” Model, a positive (+) coefficient 
means that the variable would lead to a higher pricing spread, while a negative (-) coefficient 
means the opposite, that the variable would cause the pricing spread to be lower, commonly 
referred to as a “tighter spread.” 
Table 5.1: Coefficient Predictions - First Scenario Pricing After Origination Model  
Variable 
Predicted 
Coefficient  Reason 
Current Deal 
Spread  Dependent Variable 
Current Mkt 
Spread + 
Each specific bond is expected to correlate strongly with the 
market 
Time Elapsed - Stronger performance for seasoning 
Current DSCR - Stronger performance due to higher DSCR levels over time 
Current AAA 
Subordination - 
Stronger performance due to positive changes in 
subordination levels over time  
ASER Pct - Stronger performance due to higher ASER levels 
PerformSpecialSrv
cdPct + Weaker performance due to higher Special Servicer levels 
Delinq90DayPct + Weaker performance due to higher Delinquency levels 
ForeclosurePct + Weaker performance due to higher Foreclosure levels 
REOPct + Weaker performance due to higher REO levels 
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5. 2 Regression Results – First Scenario Pricing After Origination Model 
Figure 5.1 shows the regression results for the first scenario of the “Pricing After Origination” 
study. 
Figure 5.1: Regression Results for First Scenario of Pricing After Origination Model 
(Dependent Variable = Current Deal Spread) 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.952835503 
R Square 0.907895496 
Adjusted R Square 0.907799342 
Standard Error 9.43392659 
Observations 8631 
 
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat 
Intercept 13.12414268 0.822059475 15.96495519 
Current Mkt Spread 0.761867788 0.002625107 290.2235146 
Time Elapsed (Days) -0.003261202 0.000191753 -17.00727436 
CurrentDSCR_NCF 1.801957777 0.281286609 6.406127124 
CurrentAaaSubordination 0.435732501 0.029453066 14.79413027 
ASERPct 5.055271493 0.796433702 6.347385202 
PerformSpecialSrvcdPct 1.032199863 0.212885934 4.848605274 
Delinq90DayPct 1.631779786 0.255799131 6.379145147 
ForeclosurePct -4.542314117 0.515571202 -8.810255696 
REOPct 3.294919816 0.308056356 10.69583455 
 
Using the methodology described in Chapter 3, the authors were able to capture 95.3% of the 
variation in current deal spread as it changed over time. All independent variables are significant 
at a 95% confidence level. 
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5. 3 Discussion of Variables – First Scenario Pricing After Origination Model 
Table 5.2: Discussion of Variables - First Scenario Pricing After Origination Model 
Current Market Spread The positive sign is as expected. A 1% increase 
in the market spread results in a .76% increase 
in the expected spread 
Time Elapsed (Days) The negative sign is as expected. There is a 
strong preference for seasoning. Each year of 
seasoning decreases the expected deal spread 
by 1.18%. 
CurrentDSCR NCF The positive sign is not expected. The 
regression shows that spreads increase with a 
higher current level of DSCR. 
CurrentAAA Subordination The positive sign is not expected. The 
regression shows that spreads increase with a 
higher current level of AAA subordination. 
ASER Pct The positive sign is not expected. The 
regression shows that spreads increase with a 
higher level of ASER loan balance. 
Perform Special Servicer The positive sign is as expected. A 1% increase 
of the loan balance in Special Servicer 
increases the expected deal spread by 1.03%. 
Delinquency 90 Days The positive sign is as expected. A 1% increase 
of the loan balance in 90 days delinquency 
increases the expected deal spread by 1.63%. 
Foreclosure Pct The negative sign is not expected. A 1% 
increase of the loan balance in foreclosure 
decreases the expected deal spread by 4.54%. 
REO Pct The positive sign is as expected. A 1% increase 
of the loan balance in REO status increases the 
expected deal spread by 3.29%. 
 
The authors are unable to explain the sign on the CurrentDSCR NCF, Current AAA 
Subordination, ASER Pct, and Foreclosure Pct variables. There must be other factors in the data 
set that are influencing the incorrect sign on these variables and that are not being controlled for 
in the regression.  
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The abbreviated regression equation for this scenario is, 
 
Pit = α + βXit + …+ δi + εit 
 
In this abbreviated regression equation the BXit is the CurrentDSCR NCF variable, and sigma (δ) 
represents the omitted factors that are not included in the regression. There is something 
inherently more risky with the deals in that a higher DSCR ratio, higher subordination ratio, or a 
Foreclosure Percent, would result in a higher current spread. This can be explained by the sigma, 
which represents the omitted factors. 
 
The results of this first scenario model run counter to theory. The authors recognized that a new 
model, the second scenario, was needed to eliminate the sigma, or omitted factors, in this 
regression analysis. 
 
5.4 Coefficient Predictions – Second Scenario Pricing After Origination Model 
Table 5.3 shows the coefficient predictions for the second scenario of the “Pricing After 
Origination” Model. 
Table 5.3: Coefficient Predictions – Second Scenario Pricing After Origination Model  
Variable 
Predicted 
Coefficient  Reason 
Diff in Deal 
Spread  Dependent Variable 
Diff in Current 
Mkt Spread + 
Each specific bond is expected to correlate strongly with the 
market 
Time Elapsed - Stronger performance for seasoning 
Diff in DSCR - Stronger performance due to higher DSCR levels over time 
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Diff in AAA 
Subordination - 
Stronger performance due to positive changes in 
subordination levels over time 
ASER Pct - Stronger performance due to higher ASER levels 
PerformSpecialSrv
cdPct + Weaker performance due to higher Special Servicer levels 
Delinq90DayPct + Weaker performance due to higher Delinquency levels 
ForeclosurePct + Weaker performance due to higher Foreclosure levels 
REOPct + Weaker performance due to higher REO levels 
 
5.5 Regression Results – Second Scenario Pricing After Origination Model 
Figure 5.2 shows the regression results for the second scenario of the “Pricing After Origination” 
study. 
Figure 5.2: Regression Results for Second Scenario of Pricing After Origination Model 
(Dependent Variable = Diff in Current Deal Spread)  
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.957890211 
R Square 0.917553657 
Adjusted R Square 0.917467586 
Standard Error 10.93939698 
Observations 8631 
 
 
 
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat 
Intercept 2.953438833 0.224524974 13.15416626 
Diff in Current Mkt 
Spread 0.772911569 0.002748988 281.162195 
Time Elapsed (Days) -0.005649949 0.00022456 -25.1601304 
Diff in DSCR -6.893235823 0.556544473 -12.38577716 
Diff in AAA 
Subordination -0.657270572 0.054618356 -12.0338769 
ASERPct -1.980245409 0.929002068 -2.131583424 
PerformSpecialSrvcdPct 2.372389336 0.24594456 9.646032956 
Delinq90DayPct 2.50856353 0.291573246 8.60354497 
ForeclosurePct -4.283588852 0.601751855 -7.118530369 
REOPct 4.366589741 0.355191421 12.2936239 
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Using the methodology described in Chapter 3 the authors were able to capture 95.8% of the 
variation in the difference in current deal spread since origination. All independent variables are 
significant at a 95% confidence level. 
5. 6 Discussion of Variables – Second Scenario Pricing After Origination Model 
Table 5.4: Discussion of Variables - Second Scenario Pricing After Origination Model 
Diff in Curr Mkt Spread The positive sign is as expected. A 1% increase 
in the market spread results in a .77% increase 
in the expected change in deal spread. 
Time Elapsed (Days) The negative sign is as expected. There is a 
strong preference for seasoning. Each year of 
seasoning decreases the expected change in 
deal spread by 2.09%. 
CurrentDSCR NCF The negative sign is as expected. A 1% 
increase in the current DSCR level results in a 
6.89% decrease in the expected change in deal 
spread. 
CurrentAAA Subordination The negative sign is as expected. A 1% 
increase in the current subordination level 
results in a .65% decrease in the expected 
change in deal spread. 
ASER Pct The negative sign is as expected. The 
regression shows that spreads decrease with a 
higher level of ASER loan balance. 
Perform Special Servicer The positive sign is as expected. A 1% increase 
of the loan balance in Special Servicer 
increases the expected change in deal spread 
by 2.37%. 
Delinquency 90 Days The positive sign is as expected. A 1% increase 
of the loan balance in 90 days delinquency 
increases the expected change in deal spread 
by 2.51%. 
Foreclosure Pct The negative sign is not expected. A 1% 
increase of the loan balance in foreclosure 
decreases the expected change in deal spread 
by 4.28%. 
REO Pct The positive sign is as expected. A 1% increase 
of the loan balance in REO status increases the 
expected change in deal spread by 4.37%. 
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After analyzing the results of the first scenario, this model was created to try to minimize the 
influence of the omitted factors on the coefficients signs in the first scenario. The authors 
recognized that the pricing data was in panel data format, but the authors did not want to build a 
panel model. Instead, the authors built a model based on first differences. This model analyzes 
the changes in current prices since origination as a function of changes of current market and 
performance variables since origination. 
 
The signs on the variables are now as expected except for Foreclosure Pct. This model greatly 
improves upon the first scenario. By controlling for changes since origination for the market and 
performance variables, the second scenario eliminates the omitted factors found in the first 
scenario and predicts the change in pricing since origination as a function of changes in these 
variables. The abbreviated regression equation for this scenario is, 
 
Pit – P0t = (βXit – βX0t) +…+ (δi  - δi) + εit 
 
The omitted factors are eliminated in this scenario, which creates a pure effect of the regression 
variables. Using first differences, the authors are properly able to analyze the price data, which is 
in panel model format, without having to actually build a panel model. 
 
The sign on the Foreclosure Pct, which is still positive as in the previous model, might be due to 
the analysis of strictly AAA deals. Once an underperforming loan goes into Foreclosure the loss 
is attributed to the lower rated deal tranches. Therefore the AAA deals end up with a stronger 
pool of loans. Another explanation for the positive sign might be that before the foreclosure stage 
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is reached, there could be uncertainty on the extent of the loss. Once it enters foreclosure the 
extent of the loss is better known. 
 
This model shows that logical changes to credit status (delinquency, REO, and ASER) and 
underlying loan quality (DSCR and AAA Subordination levels) influence deal spreads 
appropriately.  
 
The analysis in this scenario proves that investors do use credit status characteristics in pricing 
Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities. The authors can conclude that the secondary market is 
transparent in that investors are using available information to price securities appropriately. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
In conclusion, tremendous growth in the CMBS market over the last two and a half decades, this 
thesis clearly demonstrates that accurately pricing CMBS remains a complicated undertaking. 
Unlike corporate or municipal bonds, the performance of CMBS is still difficult to predict, and 
the data necessary to do so is not readily available, leaving the investor to make a lot of 
assumptions that may or may not turn out to be true. This study scrutinizes the pricing issue at 
two different stages, at origination and after origination, in an attempt to reveal which factors are 
most important in determining the appropriate price of a Commercial Mortgage Backed Security 
at each of these points in time.  
 
In studying pricing at origination, the authors show that although market spreads on CMBS 
decreased over time from 2001 to 2006, investors were actually shying away from newer 
issuances of CMBS in favor of resales and were willing to pay a premium for these older CMBS. 
These results demonstrate that the lax underwriting standards of recent years were not 
completely unnoticed by CMBS investors.  
 
In examining pricing after origination the authors demonstrate that variations do exist in the 
pricing of CMBS and that overall the market has significant enough transparency to incorporate 
different factors into investment decisions. The second scenario builds upon the first scenario by 
predicting the change in pricing since origination as a function of change in those variables, and 
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eliminates the omitted factors found in the first scenario. The second scenario greatly improves 
upon the first as the results are more intuitive. 
 
The authors recognize that the pricing data provided by Morgan Stanley did not validate the 
pricing data during the first half of 2008, but that it did validate the prices prior 2008. The 
authors were not able to determine the reason behind this discrepancy.  Due to the proprietary 
nature of the CMBS market, and news coverage during the first half of 2008, very few 
companies were willing to provide specific pricing data that could have helped the authors 
provide an explanation for this discrepancy. The authors believe that volatility in the market, 
irrational investor behavior, or the lag associated with Trepp’s model to incorporate actual prices 
during this time frame are possible explanations. 
 
The authors have shown that the CMBS pricing market is transparent at origination and after, 
and have identified pricing factors in both markets. However, the factors that influence pricing 
are different. At origination, there is more emphasis on underlying loan characteristics such as 
Debt Service Coverage Ratio, Loan to Value, and geographic concentration. After origination, 
emphasis is on credit status characteristics such as delinquency and foreclosure percentages. 
 
6.2 Areas of Future Research 
A potential follow up to this thesis by a future MSRED student would be to obtain actual 
transactions for at least fifty deals over a two to three year time frame. The student(s) would need 
to begin gathering data as soon as possible and attempt to obtain a corporate sponsor for the 
thesis in order to gain access to the actual closed transaction prices in the secondary market. 
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Another potential paper could explore CMBS pricing in the first half of 2008. This paper 
demonstrates that pricing during this time frame was extremely volatile and there are still many 
unanswered questions as to why this period saw more volatility than any other economic crisis in 
history, including the Savings and Loan Scandal. The most difficult task for such a study would 
likely be procuring the data necessary to provide a meaningful analysis.  
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Appendix 
 
Exhibit 1 
 
DealName   
DealType   
Distdate Distribution Date.  Packed date in the form of yyyymmdd 
CutoffBalance 
Collateral Balance as of the original collateral cutoff date for the 
transaction.  Generally, the cutoff date is the first of the month in 
which the transaction closes 
CurrentBalance Current Collateral Balance 
CutoffAssetCount Number of Loans as of the original cutoff date 
CurrentAssetCount Current Number of Loans 
MonthsLocked 
Average numbers of months before the loans can prepay--
"lockout".  For modeling purposes, loans which can be defeased 
are treated as locked out. 
MonthsYM 
Average number of months before the end of the yield maintenance 
period.  Generally starts at the end of lockout 
MonthsPenalty 
Average number of months before the end of the fixed prepayment 
penalty period 
MonthsToMaturity Average number of months to maturity 
CutoffDSCR_NOI DSCR as of closing, based on net operating income 
CurrentDSCR_NOI Current DSCR, based on net operating income 
CutoffDSCR_NCF DSCR as of closing, based on net cash flow 
CurrentDSCR_NCF Current DSCR, based on net cash flow 
CutoffLTV Average loan to value ratio at closing 
CurrentLTV Current average loan to value ratio 
CutoffAaaSubordination Lowest Credit enhancement at the AAA level as of closing 
CurrentAaaSubordination Current lowest credit enhancement at the AAA level 
CutoffBaa3Subordination 
Lowest Credit enhancement at the Baa3 level as of closing.  Break 
point between investment grade and "B pieces" 
CurrentBaa3Subordination Current lowest credit enhancement at the Aaa3 level 
GrossWAC Weighted average coupon on the collateral, before servicing fees. 
ASERAmt 
Current balance of loans subject to "Appraisal Subordinate 
Entitlement Reductions", i.e., loans where the servicer is no longer 
advancing 
ASERCnt Current count of loans subject to ASER 
ASERPct 
Current balance of loans subject to ASER, as a % of Current 
Balance 
CutoffDate Original collateral cutoff date 
SettleDate Original Settlement Date 
Underwriters   
RatingAgencies   
MonthsSeasoned Average number of months the collateral has seasoned 
MaturityLTV Projects LTV value at maturity, assuming appraisal as of cutoff 
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Factor Ratio of current collateral balance to cutoff balance 
NetWAC Weighted average coupon on the collateral, after servicing fees. 
PerformSpecialSrvcdAmt 
Current balance of loans which are not delinquent but have been 
transferred to the special servicer 
PerformSpecialSrvcdCnt Count 
PerformSpecialSrvcdPct Percent, based on balance. 
Within30DayAmt Balance of loans which are current 
Within30DayCnt   
Within30DayPct   
Delinq30DayAmt 
Balance of loans which are > 30 days delinquent, but less than 60 
days 
Delinq30DayCnt   
Delinq30DayPct   
Delinq60DayAmt 
Balance of loans which are > 60 days delinquent, but less than 90 
days 
Delinq60DayCnt   
Delinq60DayPct   
Delinq90DayAmt Balance of loans which are > 90 days delinquent 
Delinq90DayCnt   
Delinq90DayPct   
CurrentExtendedBalloonAmt 
Balance of loans which are past their original maturity date, but are 
current on payment of principal and interest, other than the balloon 
CurrentExtendedBalloonCnt   
CurrentExtendedBalloonPct   
ForeclosureAmt Balance of loans in foreclosure 
ForeclosureCnt   
ForeclosurePct   
REOAmt Balance of loans categorized as "real estate owned" 
REOCnt   
REOPct   
DelinqUnknownAmt 
Balance of loans without a delinquency status code, or with a code 
which is not recognized 
DelinqUnknownCnt   
DelinqUnknownPct   
RetailUnanchoredAmt Balance of loans classified as Retail/Unanchored 
RetailUnanchoredCnt   
RetailUnanchoredPct   
RetailAnchoredAmt Balance of loans classified as Retail/Anchored 
RetailAnchoredCnt   
RetailAnchoredPct   
WarehouseAmt Balance of loans classified as Warehouse 
WarehouseCnt   
WarehousePct   
IndustrialAmt Industrial 
IndustrialCnt   
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IndustrialPct   
OfficeAmt Office 
OfficeCnt   
OfficePct   
MixedUseAmt Mixed Use (office/retail/multifamily) 
MixedUseCnt   
MixedUsePct   
OtherAmt Other 
OtherCnt   
OtherPct   
MultifamilyAmt 
Multifamily (excluding Cooperative Housing once that type was 
introduced) 
MultifamilyCnt   
MultifamilyPct   
MobileHomeAmt 
Secured by Mobile Home Park or other form of Manufactured 
Housing 
MobileHomeCnt   
MobileHomePct   
HotelLimitedAmt Limited Service Hotel 
HotelLimitedCnt   
HotelLimitedPct   
HotelFullAmt 
Full Service Hotel (generally, includes some form of restaurant and 
meeting rooms) 
HotelFullCnt   
HotelFullPct   
HotelOtherAmt Other type of Hotel  
HotelOtherCnt   
HotelOtherPct   
HealthcareAmt 
Healthcare, generally nursing home or hospital.  Most doctors 
offices would be under office 
HealthcareCnt   
HealthcarePct   
SelfStorageAmt Self Storage facility 
SelfStorageCnt   
SelfStoragePct   
CTLAmt 
Current balance of loans which are categorized as "credit tenant 
leases" 
CTLCnt   
CTLPct   
TypeUndefinedAmt   
TypeUndefinedCnt   
TypeUndefinedPct   
State1Name Largest state concentration, by balance, at the property level 
State1Amt   
State1PropCnt   
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State1Pct   
State2Name   
State2Amt   
State2PropCnt   
State2Pct   
State3Name   
State3Amt   
State3PropCnt   
State3Pct   
State4Name   
State4Amt   
State4PropCnt   
State4Pct   
State5Name   
State5Amt   
State5PropCnt   
State5Pct   
Top1LoansAmt Largest loan balance 
Top1LoansPct   
Top5LoansAmt Current balance of 5 largest loans 
Top5LoansPct   
Top10LoansAmt 10 largest 
Top10LoansPct   
Top15LoansAmt 15 largest 
Top15LoansPct   
FixedAmt Balance of loans paying a fixed interest rate 
FixedCnt   
FixedPct   
FloatingAmt Balance of loans paying a floating interest rate 
FloatingCnt   
FloatingPct   
LockPct Percent of loans, by balance, currently in lockout 
YMPct 
Percent of loans, by balance, currently subject to yield maintenance 
prepayment penalties 
PPPct 
Percent of loans, by balance, currently subject to fixed prepayment 
penalties 
OpenPct Percent of loans, by balance, prepayable without penalties 
Issuer   
Series   
NonPerfMatBalloonAmt 
Current balance of loans past their maturity date, which are not 
current on principal and interest 
NonPerfMatBalloonCnt   
NonPerfMatBalloonPct   
IsRed Deal is currently "red", ie, still in the offering stage 
Updated Last time the deal was updated 
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RestrictedTranches 
Does the deal contain restricted tranches, generally, not publicly 
offered 
DealCategory Which "library" is it in 
MSAs_1_25_Count Number of loans which are located in the 25 largest MSA's 
MSAs_1_25_Percent   
MSAs_1_25_Amount   
MSAs_26_50_Count Number of loans which are located in the 26th through 50th MSA 
MSAs_26_50_Percent   
MSAs_26_50_Amount   
MSAs_51_Count Number of loans outside the 50 largest MSA's, but still in an MSA 
MSAs_51_Percent   
MSAs_51_Amount   
Not_in_MSA_or_NA_Count Number of loans which are outside of MSA 
Not_in_MSA_or_NA_Percent   
Not_in_MSA_or_NA_Amount   
AllCollateralIDIn  
CallProvisions Clean up call provisions 
CurrBalMfDirected 
Current balance of loans which pay the "multifamily directed" 
class 
LoanPmtFreqFlag   
DefeaseCnt 
Number of loans which have been defeased, ie, are now secured by 
government obligations 
DefeaseAmt   
DefeasePct   
CoopHousingAmt 
Current balance of loans which are secured by cooperative housing 
loans 
CoopHousingCnt   
CoopHousingPct   
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Exhibit 2 
 
DealName 
Full Name 
CUSIP 
TrancheName 
Bond Balance 
OriginalSubordinationPct 
OriginalSnPRating 
OriginalMoodysRating 
OriginalFitchRating 
pricingDt 
Price 
Yield 
Spread 
Duration 
Wal 
Yieldto 
ppymeth 
Ppyspd 
updateDt 
Dm 
Swap 
swapspread 
 
